The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Puzzle? (El Presidente del Tribunal Supremo: ¿Un problema metafísico?)

Crítica 39 (115):61 - 68 (2007)
Abstract
What are things like the Supreme Court? Gabriel Uzquiano hasdefended that they are groups, entities which are somehow composed ofmembers (at certain times) but which, unlike sets (or pluralities), allow for fluctuation in membership. The main alternative holds that 'the Supreme Court' refers (at any time) to the set (or plurality) of their members (at the time). Uzquiano motivates his view by posing a metaphysical puzzle for this reductive alternative. I argue that a parallel reasoning would also find a corresponding "puzzle" in the case of singular terms like 'The Chief Supreme Court Justice'. /// ¿Qué son cosas como el Tribunal Supremo? Gabriel Uzquiano ha defendido que son grupos, entidades de algún modo compuestas de miembros (en ciertos momentos) pero que, a diferencia de los conjuntos (o las pluralidades), permiten fluctuatión en la pertenencia. La alternativa principal sostiene que 'el Tribunal Supremo' hace referencia (en cada momento) al conjunto (o pluralidad) de sus miembros (en ese momento). Uzquiano motiva su posición planteando un problema metafísico para la alternativa reduccionista. Argumento que un razonamiento paralelo también encontraría un "problema" correspondiente en el caso de términos singulares como'el Presidente del Tribunal Supremo'.
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