The many relativisms and the question of disagreement

What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges.
Keywords relativism  contextualism  disagreement
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DOI 10.1080/09672550701383871
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Robert Stalnaker (2002). Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Relativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297 – 313.
David Lewis (1980). Index, Context, and Content. In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel 79-100.
John Macfarlane (2005). Xiv &Ast;—Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321-339.

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Citations of this work BETA
Max Kölbel (2007). How to Spell Out Genuine Relativism and How to Defend Indexical Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):281 - 288.

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