The many relativisms and the question of disagreement

Abstract
What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges.
Keywords relativism  contextualism  disagreement
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References found in this work BETA
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Relativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297 – 313.
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Telativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297-313.
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Telativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297-313.
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Telativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297 - 313.
David Lewis (1980). Index, Context, and Content. In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. 79-100.

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Citations of this work BETA
James O. Young (2009). Relativism, Standards and Aesthetic Judgements. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):221 – 231.
Max Kölbel (2007). How to Spell Out Genuine Relativism and How to Defend Indexical Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):281 – 288.

View all 8 citations

Similar books and articles
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Telativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297-313.
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Telativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297-313.
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Telativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297 - 313.
Dan López de Sa (2008). Presuppositions of Commonality. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relativising Utterance Truth. Oxford University Press. 297-310.
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Relativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297 – 313.
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
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