David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 164 (1):233-254 (2013)
The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content.
|Keywords||Sensible intuition Non-conceptualism Direct reference De re mode of presentation|
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Henry E. Allison (2004). Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Yale University Press.
Kent Bach (1987). Thought and Reference. Oxford University Press.
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