Online research in philosophy

Abstract   The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-22 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9851-x Authors Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira, The Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.