Poincaré vs. Russell on the rôle of logic in mathematicst
Philosophia Mathematica 1 (1):24-49 (1993)
| Abstract | In the early years of this century, Poincaré and Russell engaged in a debate concerning the nature of mathematical reasoning. Siding with Kant, Poincaré argued that mathematical reasoning is characteristically non-logical in character. Russell urged the contrary view, maintaining that (i) the plausibility originally enjoyed by Kant's view was due primarily to the underdeveloped state of logic in his (i.e., Kant's) time, and that (ii) with the aid of recent developments in logic, it is possible to demonstrate its falsity. This refutation of Kant's views consists in showing that every known theorem of mathematics can be proven by purely logical means from a basic set of axioms. In our view, Russell's alleged refutation of Poincaré's Kantian viewpoint is mistaken. Poincaré's aim (as Kant's before him) was not to deny the possibility of finding a logical ‘proof’ for each theorem. Rather, it was to point out that such purely logical derivations fail to preserve certain of the important and distinctive features of mathematical proof. Against such a view, programs such as Russell's, whose main aim was to demonstrate the existence of a logical counterpart for each mathematical proof, can have but little force. For what is at issue is not whether each mathematical theorem can be fitted with a logical ‘proof’, but rather whether the latter has the epistemic features that a genuine mathematical proof has. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
David Stump (1991). Poincaré's Thesis of the Translatability of Euclidean and Non-Euclidean Geometries. Noûs 25 (5):639-657.
Ronny Desmet (2008). How Did Whitehead Become Einstein's Antagonist? Process Studies 37 (2):5-23.
Hubert C. Kennedy (1963). The Mathematical Philosophy of Giuseppe Peano. Philosophy of Science 30 (3):262-266.
Terry F. Godlove Jr (2009). Poincaré, Kant, and the Scope of Mathematical Intuition. The Review of Metaphysics 62 (4):779-801.
Peter Milne (2008). Russell's Completeness Proof. History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (1):31-62.
Michael Detlefsen (1992). Poincaré Against the Logicians. Synthese 90 (3):349 - 378.
Colin Mclarty (1997). Poincaré: Mathematics & Logic & Intuition. Philosophia Mathematica 5 (2):97-115.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads36 ( #32,994 of 549,069 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,099 of 549,069 )How can I increase my downloads? |

