David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):39-48 (2007)
“Moral vegetarianism,” the doctrine that it is immoral to eat meat, is widely dismissed as eccentric. But I argue that moral vegetarianism is thoroughly conservative—it follows directly from two basic moral principles that nearly everyone already accepts. One is that it is morally wrong to cause unnecessary pain. The other is that if it is wrong in one case to do X, then it will also be wrong to do so in another, unless the two cases differ in some morally relevant respect. Since everyone agrees that it is wrong to kill humans for food,this principle entails that defenders of meat eating must find some morally relevant difference between eating humans and eating other animals if they are to justify their practice. I argue that this burden cannot be met. Finally, I offer four arguments against the claim that the moral permissibility of eating meat is intuitively evident
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
William O. Stephens (1994). Five Arguments for Vegetarianism. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 1 (4):25-39.
Krzysztof Saja (2013). The Moral Footprint of Animal Products. Agriculture and Human Values 30 (2):193–202.
Frederick Ferré (1986). Moderation, Morals, and Meat. Inquiry 29 (1-4):391 – 406.
Frederick Ferré (1986). Moderation, Morals, and Meat. Inquiry 29 (1-4):391-406.
Mylan Engel Jr (2012). Coherentism and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Beliefs: A Case Study in How to Do Practical Ethics Without Appeal to a Moral Theory. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):50-74.
David Boonin-Vail (1993). The Vegetarian Savage: Rousseau's Critique of Meat Eating. Environmental Ethics 15 (1):75-84.
Evelyn Pluhar (1992). Who Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 5 (2):189-215.
Ben Almassi (2011). The Consequences of Individual Consumption: A Defence of Threshold Arguments for Vegetarianism and Consumer Ethics. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (4):396-411.
Jonathan Harrison (2008). The Vagaries of Vegetarianism. Ratio 21 (3):286-299.
Sarah McGrath (2009). The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference1. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.
David Boonin-Vail (1993). The Vegetarian Savage. Environmental Ethics 15 (1):75-84.
Andrew Tardiff (1998). A Catholic Case for Vegetarianism. Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):210-222.
Andrew Gleeson (2008). Eating Meat and Reading Diamond. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):157-175.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads43 ( #99,907 of 1,911,606 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #54,890 of 1,911,606 )
How can I increase my downloads?