Vegetarianism, Traditional Morality, and Moral Conservatism

Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):39-48 (2007)
“Moral vegetarianism,” the doctrine that it is immoral to eat meat, is widely dismissed as eccentric. But I argue that moral vegetarianism is thoroughly conservative—it follows directly from two basic moral principles that nearly everyone already accepts. One is that it is morally wrong to cause unnecessary pain. The other is that if it is wrong in one case to do X, then it will also be wrong to do so in another, unless the two cases differ in some morally relevant respect. Since everyone agrees that it is wrong to kill humans for food,this principle entails that defenders of meat eating must find some morally relevant difference between eating humans and eating other animals if they are to justify their practice. I argue that this burden cannot be met. Finally, I offer four arguments against the claim that the moral permissibility of eating meat is intuitively evident
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2007_1
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,305
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
William O. Stephens (1994). Five Arguments for Vegetarianism. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 1 (4):25-39.
Krzysztof Saja (2013). The Moral Footprint of Animal Products. Agriculture and Human Values 30 (2):193–202.
Evelyn Pluhar (1992). Who Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 5 (2):189-215.
Sarah McGrath (2009). The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference1. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.
David Boonin-Vail (1993). The Vegetarian Savage. Environmental Ethics 15 (1):75-84.
Andrew Gleeson (2008). Eating Meat and Reading Diamond. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):157-175.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

49 ( #97,730 of 1,932,594 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #102,951 of 1,932,594 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.