Wright on the non-mechanizability of intuitionist reasoning
Philosophia Mathematica 3 (1):103-119 (1995)
| Abstract | Crispin Wright joins the ranks of those who have sought to refute mechanist theories of mind by invoking Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. His predecessors include Gödel himself, J. R. Lucas and, most recently, Roger Penrose. The aim of this essay is to show that, like his predecessors, Wright, too, fails to make his case, and that, indeed, he fails to do so even when judged by standards of success which he himself lays down. | |||||||||
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