Hintikka's conception of epistemic logic

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):205 – 208 (1969)
Abstract
"hintikka's conception of epistemic logic" is a critical comment on hintikka's defence of his philosophical method ("epistemic logic and the methods of philosophical analysis", "a.J.P." no.1, 1968). There is a discussion of the symbolization and analysis of "a knows that p", "a knows that he knows that p", And the notions of virtual equivalence and virtual implication. The conclusion drawn is that whereas hintikka thought his critics misunderstood his method, In fact they were attacking his employment of it
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References found in this work BETA
H. P. Grice (1961). The Causal Theory of Perception, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121:121-152.
Jaakko Hintikka (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
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