Hume's Pragmaticist Argument for the Reality of God

Journal of Speculative Philosophy 9 (1):1 - 13 (1995)
Abstract
The author examines Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to discover a variant of the usual teleological argument that abandons reliance on analogical reasoning. This second version, never refuted in the Dialogues, is termed "pragmaticist" in Peirce's sense. It relies on an abductive hypothesis that claims not logical proof but the power of instinctual conviction. The Dialogues' espousal of sound common sense may then be viewed as an imperfectly articulated precursor of Peirce's pragmaticist argument for the reality rather than the existence of God.
Keywords pragmaticism  Hume  reality of God  Peirce
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,399
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Bernardo J. Canteñs (2002). Peirce and the Spontaneous Conjectures of Instinctive Reason. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76:89-101.
James Franklin (1980). More on Part IX of Hume's Dialogues. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (118):69-71.
Charles G. Conway (2008). The Normative Sciences at Work and Play. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (2):pp. 288-311.
William L. Rowe (2009). Alvin Plantinga on the Ontological Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2):87 - 92.
Don Garrett (2012). What's True About Hume's 'True Religion'? Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):199-220.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

10 ( #148,640 of 1,102,934 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #62,013 of 1,102,934 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.