Brian Loar on singular terms

Philosophical Studies 37 (3):271 - 280 (1980)
Abstract
In "the semantics of singular terms," brian loar described and criticized a "causal" theory of reference and offered a new "description" theory. It is argued that the particular causal theory described is not to be found in the papers by donnellan and kripke cited as evidence for it, And is a straw man. Further "prima facie", Loar's new description theory fails to meet kripke's noncircularity condition. Should loar attempt to meet it, His theory is likely to run foul of kripke's usual "arguments from ignorance and error" against description theories
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372448
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Michael Devitt (1989). Against Direct Reference. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):206-240.
Kent Bach (1981). What's in a Name. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (4):371 – 386.
Michael Devitt (1984). Thoughts and Their Ascription. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
Michael Devitt (1981). Critical Notice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):211 – 221.

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