Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 37 (3):271 - 280 (1980)
|Abstract||In "the semantics of singular terms," brian loar described and criticized a "causal" theory of reference and offered a new "description" theory. It is argued that the particular causal theory described is not to be found in the papers by donnellan and kripke cited as evidence for it, And is a straw man. Further "prima facie", Loar's new description theory fails to meet kripke's noncircularity condition. Should loar attempt to meet it, His theory is likely to run foul of kripke's usual "arguments from ignorance and error" against description theories|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jody Azzouni (2011). Singular Thoughts (Objects-Directed Thoughts). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):45-61.
Thomas Hofweber (2005). Number Determiners, Numbers, and Arithmetic. Philosophical Review 114 (2):179-225.
Hiroki Nomoto (forthcoming). A General Theory of Bare “Singular” Kind Terms. In Proceedings of the Poster Session of the 29th Annual West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics (WCCFL 29).
Brian Loar (1987). Truth Beyond All Verification. In Barry Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy. Martinus Nijhoff.
Jerry Fodor (1982). A Reply to Brian Loar's "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:644 - 653.
Brian Loar (1981). Mind and Meaning. Cambridge University Press.
Kathleen Lennon (1984). Anti-Reductionist Materialism. Inquiry 27 (December):363-380.
Brian Loar (1980). Names and Descriptions: A Reply to Michael Devitt. Philosophical Studies 38 (1):85 - 89.
Stephen Law (2004). Loar's Defence of Physicalism. Ratio 17 (1):60-67.
Brian Loar (1976). The Semantics of Singular Terms. Philosophical Studies 30 (6):353 - 377.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads12 ( #101,503 of 757,546 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,427 of 757,546 )
How can I increase my downloads?