Completeness and indeterministic causation

Philosophy of Science 63 (3):184 (1996)
In The Chances of Explanation, Paul Humphreys presents a metaphysical analysis of causation. In this paper, I argue that this analysis is flawed. Humphreys' model of Causality incorporates three completeness requirements. I show that these completeness requirements, when applied in the world, force us to take causally irrelevant factors to be causally relevant. On this basis, I argue that Humphreys' analysis should be rejected
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/289950
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Eric Marcus (2001). Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):57 - 83.
Paul Humphreys (1980). Probabilistic Causality and Multiple Causation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:25 - 37.
Richard Otte (1986). Reichenbach, Causation, and Explanation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:59 - 65.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

6 ( #344,709 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #354,177 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.