David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466 (2009)
The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds , Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.
|Keywords||Mirroring Pretense Empathy Automaticity Reliability|
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References found in this work BETA
Frederique De Vignemont & Tania Singer (2006). The Empathic Brain: How, When and Why? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (10):435-441.
Alvin Goldman (1993). Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
Charles M. Gray, P. Kreiter Konig, Andreas K. Engel & Wolf Singer (1992). Oscillatory Responses in Cat Visual Cortex Exhibit Inter-Columnar Synchronization Which Reflects Global Stimulus Properties. Nature 338:334-7.
Pierre Jacob (2009). The Tuning-Fork Model of Human Social Cognition: A Critique☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
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