Graduate studies at Western
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513 (2006)
|Abstract||Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an explanation of their evidential role without any appeal to the representation of rules. Introduction The evidence for linguistic theories A tension in the linguists' view of intuitions Intuitions in general Linguistic intuitions Comparison of the modest explanation with the standard Cartesian explanation A nonstandard Cartesian explanation of the role of intuitions? Must linguistics explain intuitions? Conclusion|
|Keywords||Cartesianism Intuition Language Linguistics Phenomena|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Barry C. Smith (2008). What Remains of Our Knowledge of Language? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (22):557-75.
Michael Devitt (2010). What "Intuitions" Are Linguistic Evidence? Erkenntnis 73 (2):251 - 264.
Gergo Somodi (2009). Ignorance Radicalized. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):140-156.
Michael Devitt (2010). Linguistic Intuitions Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):833 - 865.
Michael Devitt (2006). Ignorance of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mark Textor (2009). Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions. Erkenntnis 71 (3):395 - 405.
Steven Gross & Jennifer Culbertson (2011). Revisited Linguistic Intuitions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):639-656.
Nenad Miščević (2006). Intuitions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):523-548.
Gareth Fitzgerald (2009). Linguistic Intuitions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):45.
Gareth Fitzgerald (2009). Linguistic Intuitions (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):123-160.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads175 ( #2,390 of 740,021 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,992 of 740,021 )
How can I increase my downloads?