Low-grade two-dimensionalism

Philosophical Books 48 (1):1-16 (2007)
As tends to be the way with philosophical positions, there are at least as many two-dimensionalisms as there are two-dimensionalists. But painting with a broad brush, there are core epistemological and metaphysical commitments which underlie the two-dimensionalist project, commitments for which I have no sympathies. A sketch of three signi?cant points of disagreement.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0149.2007.00425.x
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2005). Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
Philippe Schlenker (2003). A Plea for Monsters. Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
John Macfarlane (2005). Xiv &Ast;—Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321-339.
Josh Dever (2001). Complex Demonstratives. Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (3):271-330.

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