David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):106-121 (2002)
Part I argues that the usc theory in Horwich’s Meaning does not give sufficient attention to the relation between language and thought. A development of the theory is proposed that gives explanatory priority to the mental. The paper also urges that Horwich’s identification of a word’s meaning by its role in explaining the cause of sentences should be broadened to include its role in explaining the linguistic and non linguistic behavior that sentences cause. Part II argues that Horwich greatly overstates the case for his use theory; that the arguments from ignorance and error against description theories of reference can be adapted against the use theory; and that a tempting development of the use theory would risk both the collapse of the theory into truth referentialism and the difficulties that have plagued truth referentialism. Finally, a consideration of our ordinary thought ascriptions provides evidence against any use theory
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References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Paul Horwich (1998). Meaning. Oxford University Press.
Michael Devitt (1999). Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. MIT Press.
Ned Block (1986). Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-78.
Michael Devitt (1995). Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Steffen Borge (2014). Horwich on Natural and Non-Natural Meaning. Acta Analytica 29 (2):229-253.
Brian Flanagan (2014). Rereading the Kripkean Intuition on Reference. Metaphilosophy 45 (1):87-95.
Antonio Rauti (2010). How Use Theories of Meaning Can Accommodate Shared Meanings: A Modal Account of Semantic Deference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):285-303.
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