Ostrich Nominalism or Mirage Realism?

In "nominalism and realism" armstrong carefully demolishes various nominalist responses to plato's "one over many" problem but simply dismissed the quinean response as "ostrich nominalism". The paper argues that plato's problem is pseudo. So to ignore it is not to behave like an ostrich. Rather to adopt realism because of this problem that isn't there is to be a "mirage realist." there are some good reasons that lead armstrong to realism but he is largely a mirage realist. Quine does not ignore any real problem for nominalism and so is not an ostrich nominalist.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,255
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
John W. Carroll (1987). Ontology and the Laws of Nature. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):261 – 276.

View all 6 citations

Similar books and articles
Panu Raatikainen (2008). ”Mirage Realism” or ”Positivism in Naturalism's Clothing”? In Tim De Mey Markku Keinänen (ed.), Acta Philosophica Fennica. The Philosophical Society of Finland 63.
James Van Cleve (1994). Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):577 - 590.
T. L. Short (2013). Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism by Paul Forster. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (3):385-387.
R. Stern (2005). Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (1):65-99.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

153 ( #8,470 of 1,700,244 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

45 ( #10,503 of 1,700,244 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.