Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery

Theoria 27 (2):229-233 (2012)
Abstract
Machery argues: (1) that “philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s —if anything, they are probably worse”; (2) that “intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference”. (1) lacks theoretical and empirical support. (2) cannot be right because usage provides the evidence that intuitions are reliable.
Keywords linguistic usage  corpus  theory of reference  bias  linguistic intuitions  Expertise Defense  elicited production  experiments  methodology
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