David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19 (2004)
How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in delusions of control (Frith, 1992). Yet, we have to be careful in the interpretation of such clinical symptoms, which cannot be so easily reduced to deficit of action monitoring or to lack of action awareness. Moreover, we should refine the definition of the sense of agency by distinguishing the sense of initiation and the sense of one's own movements. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to establish the taxonomy of the different levels of action representations
|Keywords||*Cognitive Processes *Self Perception *Sense Organs *Somesthetic Perception Cutaneous Sense Schizophrenia|
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Citations of this work BETA
M. Synofzik, G. Vosgerau & A. Newen (2008). Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multi-Factorial Two-Step Account of Agency. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen (2008). I Move, Therefore I Am: A New Theoretical Framework to Investigate Agency and Ownership. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):411-424.
Dorothée Legrand (2006). The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
N. David, A. Newen & K. Vogeley (2008). The “Sense of Agency” and its Underlying Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):523-534.
S. JoneS & C. Fernyhough (2007). Thought as Action: Inner Speech, Self-Monitoring, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):391-399.
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