Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):17 – 30 (2001)
|Abstract||In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception.|
|Keywords||meaning commonsense folk psychology|
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