Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap?

Mind 119 (476):933-951 (2010)
The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude that Chalmers has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy to succeed in blocking the conceivability argument. In doing so, my aim is not only to show that Chalmers’s argument has not refuted the phenomenal concept strategy, but also to clarify what any version of the strategy should achieve in order to be successful
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzq073
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Andreas Elpidorou (2015). A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):n/a-n/a.
Pär Sundström (2011). Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

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