How Proper Names Refer

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper develops a new account of reference-fixing for proper names. The account is built around an intuitive claim about reference fixing: the claim that I am a participant in a practice of using α to refer to o only if my uses of α are constrained by the representationally relevant ways it is possible for o to behave. §I raises examples that suggest that a right account of how proper names refer should incorporate this claim. §II provides such an account.

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Imogen Dickie
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.Peter Strawson - 1959 - London, England: Routledge. Edited by Wenfang Wang.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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