David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Hume Studies 33 (1):115-153 (2007)
Why does Hume think that the “distinct existence” of sensible objects implies their “continu’d existence”? Does Hume have any reason for thinking that objects have an intermittent existence, other than that they lack a “distinct” existence? Why does Hume think that the inference from the “coherence” of our impressions to the continued existence of objects is “at bottom” considerably different from causal reasoning? The answers proposed are, respectively, that perceptually delimited objects would for Hume be causally dependent on being perceived; that Hume’s collapse of the object/perception distinction leads him to the view that objects have as “gappy” an existence as our perceptions of them, and that cases of coherence falsify the generalizations that would need to hold for inferences from coherence to qualify as causal reasoning
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Annemarie Butler (2010). Vulgar Habits and Hume's Double Vision Argument. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):169-187.
Similar books and articles
Yumiko Inukai (2013). Perceptions and Objects: Hume's Radical Empiricism. Hume Studies 37 (2):189-210.
Annemarie Butler (2008). Natural Instinct, Perceptual Relativity, and Belief in the External World in Hume's Enquiry. Hume Studies 34 (1):115-158.
Mark Collier (1999). Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects&Quot;. Hume Studies 25 (1 and 2):155-170.
Stefanie Rocknak (2007). The Vulgar Conception of Objects in 'Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses. Hume Studies 33 (1):67-90.
Ruth Weintraub (2010). A Problem for Hume's Theory of Induction. Hume Studies 34 (2):169-187.
Keith DeRose (2005). Direct Warrant Realism. In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press.
Fred Wilson (1988). Was Hume a Subjectivist? Philosophy Research Archives 14:247-282.
Marina Frasca-Spada (1998). Space and the Self in Hume's Treatise. Cambridge University Press.
Amie L. Thomasson (2008). Existence Questions. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):63 - 78.
Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):143-161.
James Franklin (1980). More on Part IX of Hume's Dialogues. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (118):69-71.
Rachel Cohon & David Owen (1997). Hume on Representation, Reason and Motivation. Manuscrito 20:47-76.
Added to index2012-03-18
Total downloads5 ( #230,090 of 1,102,972 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #120,763 of 1,102,972 )
How can I increase my downloads?