David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):34-60 (2014)
: ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem to succeed in referring even though we get sortal classification wrong, or do not attempt to classify at all
|Keywords||demonstratives sortalism ordinary objects reference|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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