When the proof doesnt show the truth
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Abstract: Throughout this paper, by representing some paradoxes and their
associated proofs and arguments, we try to show the cases which proving
some assertions doesn’t conclude the truth of them . In the next step, we
try to find out Which proofs could be considered as reliable in a way that it
shows the Truth of their related assertion, specially We claim that math-
metical proofs could be considered as reliable ones in this sense.
Nevertheless, we claim that the validation of the previous assertion is
comparable to validation of Church Thesis in Computability Theory. So, we
could use it and we consider these proofs as reliable ones but we should be
doubtful about their truth. At last we give a possible explanation for this
subject (based on local arguments and global arguments, the concepts which
we introduce them throughout this paper), and we investigate the validity of this
explanation. What we should bold it here is: In this approach we know the proofs
in these paradoxes as correct proofs, but the point which we want to stress on that
would be: the proof doesn’t show
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