A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation
| Abstract | In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert knowledge on, or particularly a¤ected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen’s ‘liberal paradox’. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesChristian List (2008). Which Worlds Are Possible? A Judgment Aggregation Problem. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (1).
Christian List (2005). Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective. Episteme 2 (1):25-38.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads18 ( #67,474 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #7,667 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
