David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45 (2004)
This paper considers two subjective measures of the existence of unconscious mental states - the guessing criterion, and the zero correlation criterion - and considers the assumptions underlying their application in experimental paradigms. Using higher order thought theory the impact of different types of biases on the zero correlation and guessing criteria are considered. It is argued that subjective measures of consciousness can be biased in various specified ways, some of which involve the relation between first order states and second order thoughts, and hence are not errors in measurement of the conscious status of mental states; but other sorts of biases are measurement errors, involving the relation between higher order thoughts and their expression. Nonetheless, it is argued this type of bias does not preclude subjective measures - both the guessing criterion and the zero correlation criterion - as being amongst the most appropriate and useful tools for measuring the conscious status of mental states
|Keywords||*Cognitions *Consciousness States *Theories|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal (2011). Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
Zoltán Dienes & Anil Seth (2010). Gambling on the Unconscious: A Comparison of Wagering and Confidence Ratings as Measures of Awareness in an Artificial Grammar Task☆. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):674-681.
Michael Snodgrass, Natasha Kalaida & E. Samuel Winer (2009). Access is Mainly a Second-Order Process: SDT Models Whether Phenomenally (First-Order) Conscious States Are Accessed by Reflectively (Second-Order) Conscious Processes☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):561-564.
Martin Rohrmeier, Patrick Rebuschat & Ian Cross (2011). Incidental and Online Learning of Melodic Structure. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):214-222.
Anna-Marie Armstrong & Zoltan Dienes (2013). Subliminal Understanding of Negation: Unconscious Control by Subliminal Processing of Word Pairs. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1022-1040.
Similar books and articles
Katalin Balog (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
Zoltán Dienes & Josef Perner (2004). Assumptions of a Subjective Measure of Consciousness: Three Mappings. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. 56--173.
David M. Rosenthal (1993). Thinking That One Thinks. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
Neil Manson (2002). Epistemic Consciousness. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (3):425-441.
C. N. (2002). Epistemic Consciousness. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):425-441.
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Richard E. Aquila (1990). Consciousness as Higher-Order Thoughts: Two Objections. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):81-87.
David M. Rosenthal (1993). Higher-Order Thoughts and the Appendage Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):155-66.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #47,540 of 1,410,123 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #57,890 of 1,410,123 )
How can I increase my downloads?