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- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, A Reason-Based Model of Rational Choice.The standard rational choice paradigm explains an individual’s preferences by his beliefs and his fundamental desires. For instance, someone’s preference for joining the army might be explained by certain beliefs about what life in the army is like and a desire for such a life. When the paradigm is spelled out formally, the objects of preferences (such as possible professions) are usually ranked according to their expected utility, derived using a probability function reflecting current beliefs and a utility function reflecting never-changing fundamental desires. In consequence, changes in preference can result only from changes in belief, not from any fundamental changes in desire or motivation. This standard paradigm violates the intuitions of many and is frequently criticised. One shortcoming is that reasons and motivations play no explicit role. Some of the more fundamental preference changes that one can undergo seem to reach beyond information-learning and to involve a change in the reasons or goals by which one is fundamentally motivated. Such changes of motivating reasons may come in connection with a changing ability to abstractly represent certain aspects of the world (like the thirteenth move in a game) or to imagine certain qualitative aspects of the world (like feelings of complete loneliness). But standard rational choice models do not, or at least not explicitly, address these phenomena. Rather, as one can argue, they implicitly assume away limitations or changes in conceptualisation (by identifying the individual’s representation of the world with the modeller’s) or in imagination (by using invariant fundamental desires). Criticisms of rational choice theory often suffer from not offering a formal alternative. The literature has of course modelled several bounded forms of 1 rationality; these are important in their own right, but they usually take the expected-utility paradigm as their starting point and introduce certain deviations from it, without introducing reasons or motivations into the model. This paper proposes a formal reason-based model of preferences..
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This article examines Becker's thesis that the hypothesis that choices maximize expected utility relative to fixed and universal tastes provides a general framework for the explanation of behaviour. Three different models of preference revision are presented and their scope evaluated. The first, the classical conditioning model, explains all changes in preferences in terms of changes in the information held by the agent, holding fundamental beliefs and desires fixed. The second, the Jeffrey conditioning model, explains them in terms of changes in both the information held by the agent and changes in her prior beliefs, holding her fundamental desires fixed. The final model, that of generalized conditioning, allows for explanations in terms of changes in the values of all three variables. Key Words: preference change • decision theory • probability • desirability • attitude change.
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| Export citation | Other links: eprints.lse.ac.uk ppe.sagepub.com lse.ac.uk dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: eprints.lse.ac.uk ppe.sagepub.com lse.ac.uk dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This article analyzes the problem of preference imputation in rational choice political science. I argue against the well-established practice in political science of assuming selfish preferences for purely methodological reasons, regardless of its empirical plausibility (this I call a preference for selfish preferences). Real motivations are overlooked due to difficulties of imputing preferences to agents in a non-arbitrary way in the political realm. I compare the problem of preference imputation in economic and political markets, and I show the harmful consequences of the preference for selfish preferences in the field of collective action. Key Words: rational choice theory • preference • functionalism • collective action.
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| | Other links: pos.sagepub.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This essay gives necessary and sufficient conditions for recovering expected utility from choice behavior in several popular models of uncertainty. In particular, these techniques handle a finite state model; a model for which the choice space consists of probability densities and the expected utility representation requires bounded, measurable utility; and a model for which the choice space consists of Borel probability measures and the expected utility representation requires bounded, continuous utility. The key result is the identification of the continuity condition necessary for the revelation of linear utility.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity to desire—the desire of a person to express his or her social being. From an internalist point of view, that is, from a viewpoint in which not only desires but also beliefs play a key role in social explanations as mental entities, this article rejects externalist reductionism and proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, robust, and socially shaped.
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| | Other links: pos.sagepub.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called `Simultaneous Expected Utility Maximization'. It can be interpreted as agreement in a bargaining game (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution) whose players correspond to the (extremal) `acceptable priors' among which the decision maker has suspended judgment. An essential but non-standard feature of Simultaneous Expected Utility choices is their dependence on the entire choice set. This is justified by the conception of optimality as compromise rather than as superiority in pairwise comparisons.
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| | Other links: dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This paper investigates the relation between consequentialism, as conceived of in moral theory, and standard expected utility theory. I argue that there is a close connection between the two. I show furthermore that consequentialism is not neutral with regard to the values of the agent. Consequentialism, as well as standard expected utility theory, is incompatible with the recognition of considerations that depend on what could have been the case, such as regret and disappointment. I conclude that consequentialism should be rejected as a principle of rational choice and that there are reasons to doubt its plausibility in the realm of moral theory. Moreover, this is a reason to doubt whether standard expected utility theory is a plausible theory of rational choice.
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| | Other links: interscience.wiley.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Instead, preferences are usually assumed to be …xed and exogenously given. We introduce a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent’s preferences are based on certain ‘motivationally salient’properties of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Preferences may change as new properties of the alternatives become salient or previously salient ones cease to be so. We suggest that our approach captures endogenous preferences in various contexts, and helps to illuminate the distinction between formal and substantive concepts of rationality, as well as the role of perception in rational choice.
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| | Scholar | More options ... According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent’s fundamental preferences are exogenously …xed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, this model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent’s preferences. Any change in these ‘motivationally salient’ dimensions can change the agent’s preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics.
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| | Other links: eprints.lse.ac.uk lse.ac.uk personal.lse.ac.uk | Scholar | More options ... There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a ‘weighing relation’ between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someone’s preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons.
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| | Other links: onlinelibrary.wiley.com dx.doi.org doi.wiley.com | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Franz Dietrich & Christian List, A reason-based model of rational choice
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