Coming True: A Note on Truth and Actuality

Philosophical Studies 163 (2):403-427 (2013)
Abstract
John MacFarlane has recently presented a novel argument in support of truth- relativism. According to this, contextualists fail to accommodate retrospective reassessments of propositional contents, when it comes to languages which are rich enough to express actuality. The aim of this note is twofold. First, it is to argue that the argument can be effectively rejected, since it rests on an inadequate conception of actuality. Second, it is to offer a more plausible account of actuality in branching time, along the line of Lewis (1970/1983).
Keywords truth-relativism   contextualism   Actuality   future contingents
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Berit Brogaard (2008). Sea Battle Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):326–335.

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Berit Brogaard (2008). Sea Battle Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):326–335.
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