E. W. Beth as a philosopher of physics

Synthese 179 (2):271 - 284 (2011)
Abstract
This paper examines E. W. Beth's work in the philosophy of physics, both from a historical and a systematic point of view. Beth saw the philosophy of physics first of all as an opportunity to illustrate and promulgate a new and modern general approach to the philosophy of nature and to philosophy tout court: an approach characterized negatively by its rejection of all traditional metaphysics and positively by its firm orientation towards science. Beth was successful in defending this new ideology, and became its leading Dutch representative in the first two decades after the second world war. Beth also contributed importantly to the method of the philosophy of physics in a narrower sense, by proposing and promoting the semantic approach in the formal analysis of physical theories. Finally, he worked on several specific foundational questions; but he was probably too much of a logician to leave his mark in this area
Keywords Beth  Philosophy of nature  Philosophy of physics  Logic  Quantum mechanics  Relativity
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References found in this work BETA
E. Beth (1946). Discussion. Synthese 5 (1/2):94 - 95.
Dennis Dieks (2006). Another Look at General Covariance and the Equivalence of Reference Frames. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 37 (1):174-191.

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