David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11 (2):145-152 (1999)
Any time you have philosophers working on a problem, you know you’ve got troubles. If a question has attracted the attention of the philosophers that means that either it is intractably difficult with convolutions and labyrinthine difficulties that would make other researchers blanch, or that it is just flat out impossible to solve. Impossible problems masquerade as intractable problems until someone either proves the problem is impossible (which can only happen in mathematics), or someone shows all solutions to the problem violate laws of physics (like the perpetual motion machine, for example), or until enough people fail so that declaring defeat is a reasonable move. The problem of consciousness is prototypical of this latter case. Indeed, one might say that it is the Platonic ideal of such a problem. The mere fact that philosophers wrestle with the problem of consciousness should be regarded by psychologists of all stripes as extremely bad news. If the philosophers can’t make any headway, psychologists are doomed
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jeffrey Goodman (2004). An Extended Lewis-Stalnaker Semantics and The New Problem of Counterpossibles. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):35-66.
Kam-Yuen Cheng (2002). Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live Without Them? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
Susan Schneider (2007). Yes, It Does: A Diatribe on Jerry Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Psyche.
EC Barnes (1999). The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2):249-264.
Eric T. Olson (2003). Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.
Jacob J. Ross (1990). Against Postulating Central Systems in the Mind. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):297-312.
Eric Lormand (1990). Framing the Frame Problem. Synthese 82 (3):353-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #34,765 of 1,096,280 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #130,630 of 1,096,280 )
How can I increase my downloads?