|Abstract||Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log-likelihood-ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom ("Epistemic Monotonicity") which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not be a vote for an alternative, it may be any type of input, for instance a subjective degree of belief or probability of the correctness of one of the alternatives. The case of a proﬁle of subjective degrees of belief is particularly appealing, since here no parameters such as competence parameters need to be known.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Miquel Bastons (2008). The Role of Virtues in the Framing of Decisions. Journal of Business Ethics 78 (3):389 - 400.
Paul D. Thistle (1998). Social Structure, Economic Performance and Pareto Optimality. Theory and Decision 45 (2):161-173.
Hilary Greaves & David Wallace (2006). Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Fany Yuval (2002). Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto. Theory and Decision 53 (4):343-369.
Luba Sapir (1998). The Optimality of the Expert and Majority Rules Under Exponentially Distributed Competence. Theory and Decision 45 (1):19-36.
Ronald N. Giere (1969). Bayesian Statistics and Biased Procedures. Synthese 20 (3):371 - 387.
Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag (2002). Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers. Theory and Decision 52 (3):267-286.
Franz Huber (2005). Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
Stephen A. Clark (2000). Revealed Preference and Expected Utility. Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
Lyle Zynda (2000). Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #246,187 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?