General representation of epistemically optimal procedures
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log-likelihood-ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom ("Epistemic Monotonicity") which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not be a vote for an alternative, it may be any type of input, for instance a subjective degree of belief or probability of the correctness of one of the alternatives. The case of a proﬁle of subjective degrees of belief is particularly appealing, since here no parameters such as competence parameters need to be known.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2004). A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence. Synthese 142 (2):175 - 202.
Similar books and articles
Miquel Bastons (2008). The Role of Virtues in the Framing of Decisions. Journal of Business Ethics 78 (3):389 - 400.
Paul D. Thistle (1998). Social Structure, Economic Performance and Pareto Optimality. Theory and Decision 45 (2):161-173.
Hilary Greaves & David Wallace (2006). Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Fany Yuval (2002). Sophisticated Voting Under the Sequential Voting by Veto. Theory and Decision 53 (4):343-369.
Luba Sapir (1998). The Optimality of the Expert and Majority Rules Under Exponentially Distributed Competence. Theory and Decision 45 (1):19-36.
Ronald N. Giere (1969). Bayesian Statistics and Biased Procedures. Synthese 20 (3):371 - 387.
Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag (2002). Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers. Theory and Decision 52 (3):267-286.
Franz Huber (2005). Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
Stephen A. Clark (2000). Revealed Preference and Expected Utility. Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
Lyle Zynda (2000). Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #374,854 of 1,911,606 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #457,720 of 1,911,606 )
How can I increase my downloads?