Is a Jamesian Wager the only safe bet? On Jeff Jordan's new book on Pascal's Wager

Abstract
In his new book on Pascal's Wager, Jeff Jordan argues that only the ‘Jamesian’ version of the wager argument, as he sees it presented in William James' essay The Will to Believe , constitutes a sound pragmatic argument in favour of theism, whereas Pascal's original wager argument is doomed to fail on various grounds. This article argues that Jordan's theory is untenable. The many-gods objection is used as an example: it is demonstrated that the Jamesian Wager argument too is powerless to rebut this objection.
Keywords William James
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Alan Hájek, Pascal's Wager. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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