|Abstract||The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising …eld of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a speci…c type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore suggest restricting independence to "premises", which leads to a generalised premise-based procedure. This procedure is proven to be possible if the premises are logically independent. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: D70, D71, D79.|
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