David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):746-761 (2004)
Recent theoretical and empirical work in cognitive science and neuroscience is brought into contact with the concept of the flow experience. After a brief exposition of brain function, the explicit–implicit distinction is applied to the effortless information processing that is so characteristic of the flow state. The explicit system is associated with the higher cognitive functions of the frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe structures and has evolved to increase cognitive flexibility. In contrast, the implicit system is associated with the skill-based knowledge supported primarily by the basal ganglia and has the advantage of being more efficient. From the analysis of this flexibility/efficiency trade-off emerges a thesis that identifies the flow state as a period during which a highly practiced skill that is represented in the implicit system’s knowledge base is implemented without interference from the explicit system. It is proposed that a necessary prerequisite to the experience of flow is a state of transient hypofrontality that enables the temporary suppression of the analytical and meta-conscious capacities of the explicit system. Examining sensory-motor integration skills that seem to typify flow such as athletic performance, writing, and free-jazz improvisation, the new framework clarifies how this concept relates to creativity and opens new avenues of research
|Keywords||*Basal Ganglia *Cognitive Processes *Frontal Lobe *Temporal Lobe Cognitive Science Neurosciences|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Anthony Randal McIntosh, M. Natasha Rajah & Nancy J. Lobaugh (2003). Functional Connectivity of the Medial Temporal Lobe Relates to Learning and Awareness. Journal of Neuroscience 23 (16):6520-6528.
Nobuyuki Kawai (2004). Action Planning in Humans and Chimpanzees but Not in Monkeys. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):42-43.
Scott Glover (2004). Separate Visual Representations in the Planning and Control of Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):3-24.
Peter J. Bayley, Jennifer C. Frascino & Larry R. Squire (2005). Robust Habit Learning in the Absence of Awareness and Independent of the Medial Temporal Lobe. Nature 436 (7050):550-553.
Michel T. de Schotten, Marika Urbanski, Hugues Duffau, Emmanuelle Volle, Richard Lévy, Bruno Dubois & Paolo Bartolomeo (2005). Direct Evidence for a Parietal-Frontal Pathway Subserving Spatial Awareness in Humans. Science 309 (5744):2226-2228.
John C. Marshall, Gereon R. Fink, Peter W. Halligan & Giuseppe Vallar (2002). Spatial Awareness: A Function of the Posterior Parietal Lobe? Cortex 38 (2):253-257.
Brick Johnstone & Bret A. Glass (2008). Support for a Neuropsychological Model of Spirituality in Persons with Traumatic Brain Injury. Zygon 43 (4):861-874.
Hans-Otto Karnath, Susanne Ferber & Marc Himmelbach (2001). Spatial Awareness is a Function of the Temporal Not the Posterior Parietal Lobe. Nature 411 (6840):951-953.
Hans J. Markowitsch (2003). Autonoetic Consciousness. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press. 180-196.
Catherine Tallon-Baudry (2004). Attention and Awareness in Synchrony. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (12):523-525.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #30,789 of 1,679,437 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #182,836 of 1,679,437 )
How can I increase my downloads?