David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):746-761 (2004)
Recent theoretical and empirical work in cognitive science and neuroscience is brought into contact with the concept of the flow experience. After a brief exposition of brain function, the explicit–implicit distinction is applied to the effortless information processing that is so characteristic of the flow state. The explicit system is associated with the higher cognitive functions of the frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe structures and has evolved to increase cognitive flexibility. In contrast, the implicit system is associated with the skill-based knowledge supported primarily by the basal ganglia and has the advantage of being more efficient. From the analysis of this flexibility/efficiency trade-off emerges a thesis that identifies the flow state as a period during which a highly practiced skill that is represented in the implicit system’s knowledge base is implemented without interference from the explicit system. It is proposed that a necessary prerequisite to the experience of flow is a state of transient hypofrontality that enables the temporary suppression of the analytical and meta-conscious capacities of the explicit system. Examining sensory-motor integration skills that seem to typify flow such as athletic performance, writing, and free-jazz improvisation, the new framework clarifies how this concept relates to creativity and opens new avenues of research
|Keywords||*Basal Ganglia *Cognitive Processes *Frontal Lobe *Temporal Lobe Cognitive Science Neurosciences|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Nelson Cowan (2001). The Magical Number 4 in Short-Term Memory: A Reconsideration of Mental Storage Capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):87-114.
Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001). Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework. Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
Zoltán Dienes & Josef Perner (1999). A Theory of Implicit and Explicit Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):735-808.
Daniel L. Schacter (1987). Implicit Memory: History and Current Status. Journal of Experimental Psychology 13 (3):501-18.
Citations of this work BETA
Arthur M. Jacobs (2015). Neurocognitive Poetics: Methods and Models for Investigating the Neuronal and Cognitive-Affective Bases of Literature Reception. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
Sue Llewellyn (2016). Crossing the Invisible Line: De-Differentiation of Wake, Sleep and Dreaming May Engender Both Creative Insight and Psychopathology. Consciousness and Cognition 46:127-147.
Mate Gyurkovics, Eszter Kotyuk, Eniko Rozsa Katonai, Erzsebet Zsofia Horvath, Andrea Vereczkei & Anna Szekely (2016). Individual Differences in Flow Proneness Are Linked to a Dopamine D2 Receptor Gene Variant. Consciousness and Cognition 42:1-8.
Similar books and articles
Anthony Randal McIntosh, M. Natasha Rajah & Nancy J. Lobaugh (2003). Functional Connectivity of the Medial Temporal Lobe Relates to Learning and Awareness. Journal of Neuroscience 23 (16):6520-6528.
Nobuyuki Kawai (2004). Action Planning in Humans and Chimpanzees but Not in Monkeys. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):42-43.
Scott Glover (2004). Separate Visual Representations in the Planning and Control of Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):3-24.
Peter J. Bayley, Jennifer C. Frascino & Larry R. Squire (2005). Robust Habit Learning in the Absence of Awareness and Independent of the Medial Temporal Lobe. Nature 436 (7050):550-553.
Michel T. de Schotten, Marika Urbanski, Hugues Duffau, Emmanuelle Volle, Richard Lévy, Bruno Dubois & Paolo Bartolomeo (2005). Direct Evidence for a Parietal-Frontal Pathway Subserving Spatial Awareness in Humans. Science 309 (5744):2226-2228.
John C. Marshall, Gereon R. Fink, Peter W. Halligan & Giuseppe Vallar (2002). Spatial Awareness: A Function of the Posterior Parietal Lobe? Cortex 38 (2):253-257.
Brick Johnstone & Bret A. Glass (2008). Support for a Neuropsychological Model of Spirituality in Persons with Traumatic Brain Injury. Zygon 43 (4):861-874.
Hans-Otto Karnath, Susanne Ferber & Marc Himmelbach (2001). Spatial Awareness is a Function of the Temporal Not the Posterior Parietal Lobe. Nature 411 (6840):951-953.
Hans J. Markowitsch (2003). Autonoetic Consciousness. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press 180-196.
Catherine Tallon-Baudry (2004). Attention and Awareness in Synchrony. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (12):523-525.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads80 ( #56,904 of 1,938,687 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #61,980 of 1,938,687 )
How can I increase my downloads?