David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (3):323-335 (2010)
In his "From classical to constructive probability," Weatherson offers a generalization of Kolmogorov's axioms of classical probability that is neutral regarding the logic for the object-language. Weatherson's generalized notion of probability can hardly be regarded as adequate, as the example of supervaluationist logic shows. At least, if we model credences as betting rates, the Dutch-Book argument strategy does not support Weatherson's notion of supervaluationist probability, but various alternatives. Depending on whether supervaluationist bets are specified as (a) conditional bets (Cantwell), (b) unconditional bets with graded payoffs (Milne), or (c) unconditional bets with ungraded payoffs(Dietz), supervaluationist probability amounts to (a) conditional probability of truth given a truth-value, (b) the expected truth-value, or (c) the probability of truth, respectively. It is suggested that for supervaluationist logic, the third option is the most attractive one, for (unlike the other options) it preserves respect for single-premise entailment
|Keywords||probability supervaluationist logic|
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