David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):223 – 240 (2005)
In this paper, I argue that there is an inconsistency between two presentist doctrines: that of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. The former refers to the presentist belief that the past and future are equally unreal. The latter refers to the A-Theoretic intuition that the past is closed or actual, and the future is open or potential. My position in this paper is that the presentist is unable to account for the temporal asymmetry that is so fundamentally a part of her theory. In Section I, I briefly outline a recent defence of presentism due to Craig, and argue that a flaw in this defence highlights the tension between the presentist's doctrines of ontological symmetry and asymmetry of fixity. In Section II, I undertake an investigation, on the presentist's behalf, in order to determine whether she is capable of reconciling these two doctrines. In the course of the investigation, I consider different asymmetries, other than that of ontology, which might be said fundamentally to constitute temporal asymmetry, and the asymmetry of fixity in particular. In Section III, I also consider whether the presentist is able to avail herself of some of the standard B-Theoretic accounts of the asymmetry of fixity, and argue that she cannot. Finally, I conclude that temporal asymmetry cannot be accounted for (or explained) other than through the postulation of an ontological asymmetry.
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1979). Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow. Noûs 13 (4):455-476.
Robert Merrihew Adams (1986). Time and Thisness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):315-329.
Sarah Waterlow (1974). Backwards Causation and Continuing. Mind 83 (331):372-387.
W. Lane Craig (2001). Mctaggart's Paradox and Temporal Solipsism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):32 – 44.
Citations of this work BETA
Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron (2009). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291 - 309.
David Ingram (forthcoming). The Virtues of Thisness Presentism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
Stephan Torre (2011). The Open Future. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):360-373.
Joseph Diekemper (2015). The Ontology of Thisness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):49-71.
Joseph Diekemper (2007). B-Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism. Noûs 41 (3):429–452.
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