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- Vicky Dierckx & Andr (2004). Plugging a Tooth Before Anaesthetising the Patient? The Influence of People's Beliefs on Reasoning About the Temporal Order of Actions. Thinking and Reasoning 10 (4):371 – 404.According to the mental models theory, reasoning performance is primarily influenced by the number of models of a problem that can be constructed. This study investigates whether the content of the model may also influence performance. Linear reasoning problems were devised that either described a believable (script-consistent) or an unbelievable (script-inconsistent) order of actions. The results of two experiments showed that conclusions were inferred more slowly and less accurately on the basis of an unbelievable model than on a believable one. Experiment 2 revealed that script knowledge facilitated as well as impeded reasoning performance. Conclusion evaluation was faster and more accurately for script-consistent problems than for neutral problems, whereas model construction and conclusion evaluation occurred respectively more slowly and less accurately for script-inconsistent problems than for neutral problems. These results show that the content of the model is a noteworthy factor influencing reasoning performance.In my reading list | Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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