Role of the Frame Problem in Fodor's Modularity Thesis
In Ken Ford & Zenon Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited (1996)
| Abstract | It is shown that the Fodor's interpretation of the frame problem is the central indication that his version of the Modularity Thesis is incompatible with computationalism. Since computationalism is far more plausible than this thesis, the latter should be rejected. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Frame Problem Computationalism Modularity Thesis | |||||||||
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