Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300 (2007)
|Abstract||Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of nonmanipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premisebased voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented”individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented”individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.|
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Similar books and articles
Franz Dietrich Christian List, The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.
Christian List & Franz Dietrich (2007). Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation. Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300.
Franz Dietrich (2010). The Impossibility of Unbiased Judgment Aggregation. Theory and Decision 68 (3):281-299.
Christian List (2012). The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review. [REVIEW] Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
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