David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300 (2007)
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of nonmanipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premisebased voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented”individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented”individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
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Citations of this work BETA
Fabrizio Cariani (2011). Judgment Aggregation. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):22-32.
Christian List (2011). Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):1-27.
Frank Hindriks (2009). Corporate Responsibility and Judgment Aggregation. Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):161-177.
Giuseppe Primiero & Joke Meheus (2008). Majority Merging by Adaptive Counting. Synthese 165 (2):203 - 223.
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