There Is No Progress in Philosophy

Essays in Philosophy 12 (2):9 (2011)
Abstract
Except for a patina of twenty-first century modernity, in the form of logic and language, philosophy is exactly the same now as it ever was; it has made no progress whatsoever. We philosophers wrestle with the exact same problems the Pre-Socratics wrestled with. Even more outrageous than this claim, though, is the blatant denial of its obvious truth by many practicing philosophers. The No-Progress view is explored and argued for here. Its denial is diagnosed as a form of anosognosia, a mental condition where the affected person denies there is any problem. The theories of two eminent philosophers supporting the No-Progress view are also examined. The final section offers an explanation for philosophy's inability to solve any philosophical problem, ever. The paper closes with some reflections on philosophy's future.
Keywords metaphilosophy  progress in philosophy  ancient philosophy
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William J. Rapaport (1982). Unsolvable Problems and Philosophical Progress. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (4):289 - 298.
Alexander Bird (2008). Scientific Progress as Accumulation of Knowledge: A Reply to Rowbottom. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):279-281.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). N-Rays and the Semantic View of Scientific Progress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):277-278.
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