Where do preferences come from?

International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637 (2013)
Abstract
Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Preferences are usually assumed to be fixed and exogenously given. Building on related work on reasons and rational choice, we describe a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent's preferences are based on certain "motivationally salient" properties of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Preferences may change as new properties of the alternatives become salient or previously salient properties cease to be salient. Our approach captures endogenous preferences in various contexts and helps to illuminate the distinction between formal and substantive concepts of rationality, as well as the role of perception in rational choice.
Keywords preference formation  preference change  reasons-based preferences  formal versus substantive rationality  options as property bundles  motivations  Hume  perception  behavioral economics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,788
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Daniel Read (2009). Experimental Tests of Rationality. In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oup Oxford.
Martin Peterson (2006). Indeterminate Preferences. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):297-320.
Sven Ove Hansson (2001). The Modes of Value. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):33 - 46.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-12-22

Total downloads

33 ( #51,686 of 1,099,037 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #58,097 of 1,099,037 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.