What sort of representation is conscious?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):336-337 (2002)
We consider Perruchet & Vinter's (P&V's) central claim that all mental representations are conscious. P&V require some way of fixing their meaning of representation to avoid the claim becoming either obviously false or unfalsifiable. We use the framework of Dienes and Perner (1999) to provide a well-specified possible version of the claim, in which all representations of a minimal degree of explicitness are postulated to be conscious.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X02280061
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