Free choice and contextually permitted actions

Studia Logica 57 (1):193 - 220 (1996)
We present a solution to the paradox of free choice permission by introducing strong and weak permission in a deontic logic of action. It is shown how counterintuitive consequences of strong permission can be avoided by limiting the contexts in which an action can be performed. This is done by introducing the only operator, which allows us to say that only is performed (and nothing else), and by introducing contextual interpretation of action terms.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00370675
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