Graduate studies at Western
Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601 (2005)
|Abstract||This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very same worldly perceived objects or properties that caused them--will be defended as one legitimate such naturalistic theory.|
|Keywords||Causality Epistemology Intentionality Mechanism Naturalism Perception Reflexivity|
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