Minds and Machines 16 (4):479-493 (2006)
|Abstract||The field of machine perception is based on standard informational and computational approaches to perception. But naturalistic informational theories are widely regarded as being inadequate, while purely syntactic computational approaches give no account of perceptual content. Thus there is a significant need for a novel, purely naturalistic perceptual theory not based on informational or computational concepts, which could provide a new paradigm for mechanistic perception. Now specifically evolutionary naturalistic approaches to perception have been—perhaps surprisingly—almost completely neglected for this purpose. Arguably perceptual mechanisms enhance evolutionary fitness by facilitating sensorily mediated causal interactions between an organism Z and items X in its environment. A ‘reflexive’ theory of perception of this kind is outlined, according to which an organism Z perceives an item X just in case X causes a sensory organ zi of Z to cause Z to acquire a disposition toward the very same item X that caused the perception. The rest of the paper shows how an intuitively plausible account of mechanistic perception can be developed and defended in terms of the reflexive theory. Also, a compatibilist option is provided for those who wish to preserve a distinct informational concept of perception|
|Keywords||Dispositions Evolutionary theories Functionalism Informational semantics Intentionality Low versus high level perception Mechanistic perception Naturalistic theories|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
J. Dokic (1998). The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 48 (2):153-69.
J. Scott Jordan (2001). The Theory of Event Coding (TEC)'s Framework May Leave Perception Out of the Picture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):890-890.
N. Gangopadhyay & L. Schilbach (2011). Seeing Minds: A Neurophilosophical Investigation of the Role of Perception-Action Coupling in Social Perception. Social Neuroscience.
Jennifer Matey (2012). Representing the Impossible. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
Tom Stoneham (2008). A Neglected Account of Perception. Dialectica 62 (3):307-322.
John Dilworth (2005). Perceptual Causality Problems Reflexively Resolved. Acta Analytica 20 (3):11-31.
John Dilworth (2005). A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601.
John Dilworth (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
John Dilworth (2004). Naturalized Perception Without Information. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 25 (4):349-368.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #81,690 of 722,765 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,873 of 722,765 )
How can I increase my downloads?