A refutation of Goodman's type-token theory of notation
Dialectica 57 (3):330–336 (2003)
| Abstract | In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman presents a general theory of symbolic notation. However, I show that his theory could not adequately explain possible cases of natural language notational uses, and argue that this outcome undermines, not only Goodman’s own theory, but any broadly type versus token based account of notational structure. Given this failure, an alternative representational theory is proposed, in which different visual or perceptual aspects of a given physical inscription each represent a different letter, word, or other notational item. Such a view is strongly supported by the completely conventional relation between inscriptions and notation, as shown by encryption techniques etc. | |||||||||
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Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska (2007). Meaning and Interpretation. I. Studia Logica 85 (1):105 - 132.
Noa Latham (2003). What is Token Physicalism? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (3):270-290.
Nelson Goodman (1968). Languages of Art. Bobbs-Merrill.
Vinod Goel (1991). Notationality and the Information Processing Mind. Minds and Machines 1 (2):129-166.
Linda Wetzel, Types and Tokens. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nancy D. Cartwright (1979). Do Token-Token Identity Theories Show Why We Don't Need Reductionism? Philosophical Studies 36 (July):85-90.
Aaron Smuts (2003). Multiple Inheritance and Film Identity: A Reply to Dilworth. Contemporary Aesthetics 1:1-3.
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