A refutation of Goodman's type-token theory of notation

Dialectica 57 (3):330–336 (2003)
Abstract
In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman presents a general theory of symbolic notation. However, I show that his theory could not adequately explain possible cases of natural language notational uses, and argue that this outcome undermines, not only Goodman’s own theory, but any broadly type versus token based account of notational structure. Given this failure, an alternative representational theory is proposed, in which different visual or perceptual aspects of a given physical inscription each represent a different letter, word, or other notational item. Such a view is strongly supported by the completely conventional relation between inscriptions and notation, as shown by encryption techniques etc.
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Don S. Levi (2008). What's in a Name? Philosophical Investigations 31 (4):340-358.
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