David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal Of Mind And Behavior 25 (4):349-368 (2004)
The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. However, such a reflexive, naturalistic causal theory must compete with well entrenched, supposedly equally naturalistic theories of perception that are based on some concept of information, so the paper also includes some basic logical, naturalistic and explanatory criticisms of such informational views.
|Keywords||Causality Epistemology Information Nationalism Perception|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
John Dilworth (2010). Realistic Virtual Reality and Perception. Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):23-42.
John Dilworth (2010). More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory. Minds and Machines 20 (3):455-474.
John Dilworth (2006). Perception, Introspection, and Functional Consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.
Similar books and articles
Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis (2012). Perception: Embodiment and Beyond. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 17 (4):363-367.
Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.
John Hyman (1992). The Causal Theory of Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):277-296.
Kenneth H. Norwich (1991). On the Fundamental Nature of Perception. Acta Biotheoretica 39 (1).
Robert A. Oakes (1978). How to Rescue the Traditional Causal Theory of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):370-383.
John Dilworth (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
John Dilworth (2005). Perceptual Causality Problems Reflexively Resolved. Acta Analytica 20 (3):11-31.
John Dilworth (2005). A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601.
John Dilworth (2006). A Reflexive Dispositional Analysis of Mechanistic Perception. Minds and Machines 16 (4):479-493.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads35 ( #41,688 of 1,089,154 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,735 of 1,089,154 )
How can I increase my downloads?