Graduate studies at Western
Minds and Machines 18 (4):527-546 (2008)
|Abstract||A novel semantic naturalization program is proposed. Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as being purely abstract, so that concrete cognitive states are only indexed by them rather than instantiating them|
|Keywords||Dispositions Indexing theories Informational semantics Interactive causality Perception Propositions Representation Semantic naturalization|
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