The double content of perception

Synthese 146 (3):225-243 (2005)
Clearly we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual content be explained or analyzed? I argue that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of an object X, and about the object X itself. On this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y?(X?) as a higher level of content, which data does not itself provide lower level X-related content, but only an aspectually encoded form of such data. Hence the relevant perceptual data Y?(X?) must be.
Keywords Content  Data  Epistemology  Perception  Representation
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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Athanassios Raftopoulos (2015). The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):87-103.
John Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.

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