David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):187-203 (2005)
I argue that perceptual content involves representations both of aspects of objects, and of objects themselves, whether at the level of conscious perception, or of low-level perceptual processing - a double content structure. I present an 'orientational' theory of the relations of the two kinds of perceptual content, which can accommodate both the general semantic possibility of perceptual misrepresentation, and also species of it involving characteristic perceptual confusions of aspectual and intrinsic content. The resulting theoretical structure is argued to be a broadly methodological or logical one, rather than a substantive theory that is open to empirical refutation
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Orientation Perception Representation|
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References found in this work BETA
A. Noe & E. Thompson (eds.) (2002). Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. MIT Press.
John Dilworth (2005). The Double Content of Art. Prometheus Books.
Citations of this work BETA
John Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.
John Dilworth (2007). In Support of Content Theories of Art. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):19 – 39.
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