Frankfurt counterexample defended

Analysis 71 (1):102-104 (2011)
In this paper I argue that even if we accept that Jones does not kill Smith in the counterfactual scenario, Frankfurt’s counterexample is still safe because showing that Jones does not kill Smith in the counterfactual scenario does not show that Jones avoids killing Smith, because whether Black intervenes is not up to Jones. I argue that Frankfurt’s counterexample does not depend on the agent acting (let alone doing the same thing) in the counterfactual scenario.
Keywords Frankfurt  free will  Principle of Alternate Possibilities
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anq110
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Ezio Di Nucci (2012). Priming Effects and Free Will. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):725-734.
Ezio Di Nucci (2014). Avoiding and Alternate Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):1001-1007.

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